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In this review we provide a discussion of the concept of alternatives and its role in linguistic
and psycholinguistic theorizing in the context of the contributions that have appeared in the
Frontiers Research Topic The Role of Alternatives in Language. We are discussing the
linguistic phenomena for which alternatives have been argued to play a paramount role:
negation, counterfactual sentences, scalar implicatures and exhaustivity, focus,
contrastive topics, and sentences with bare plurals and with definite plurals. We review
in how far alternatives are relevant for these phenomena and how this relevance has been
captured by theoretical linguistic accounts. Regarding processing, we discuss the mental
activation of alternatives: its mandatory vs. optional nature, its time course. We also
address the methodological issue of how experimental studies operationalize alternatives.
Finally, we explore the phenomenon of individual variation, which increasingly attracts
attention in linguistics. In sum, this review gives an inclusive and broad discussion of
alternatives by bringing together different research strands whose findings and theoretical
proposals can advance our knowledge of alternatives in inspiring cross-fertilization.
Keywords: alternatives, negation, counterfactual, focus, scalar implicature, homogeneity, individual variation,
alternative activation
INTRODUCTION
Many linguistic utterances convey meaning that must be interpreted against an alternative meaning
in order to be fully informative, or even interpretable. For instance, when I say If I were rich I would
travel the world in 80 days, I am talking about worlds where the proposition I am rich is true: I am
(usually) saying that these worlds are non-factual worlds and that in the actual world the proposition
I am rich is false. Thus, I am juxtaposing different (sets of) worlds. Another example is negation.
When I say Chris doesn’t eat rhubarb I am making an assertion about the actual world: in the actual
world, the proposition Chris doesn’t eat rhubarb is true. Usually, though, when I use negation, I am
also considering (an) alternative (set of) world(s). In the present case these worlds would be worlds
where the proposition Chris eats rhubarb is true. Again, we juxtapose alternative worlds.
Since propositions denote sets of worlds, another way of describing the above phenomena is to say
that alternative propositions are involved in the interpretation of these sentences, for instance {Chris
eats rhubarb, Chris doesn’t eat rhubarb}. And since sentences are the linguistic objects that may
denote propositions, substituting a linguistic expression in a sentence by a different expression will
usually produce an alternative proposition. Consider Chris ate some of the biscuits. When we
substitute some for all, the sentence changes its meaning: Chris ate all of the biscuits is true in different
worlds. So the two sentences denote alternative propositions. The two expressions some and all also
are alternatives—on the level of expressions, and on the level of the semantic objects that are denoted
by these expressions, here quantificational determiners. Importantly, the presence of an expression
like some typically in itself evokes alternatives: The sentence Chris ate some of the biscuits has the






Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, Netherlands
Anna Czypionka,





This article was submitted to
Language Sciences,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Communication
Received: 17 March 2021
Accepted: 25 May 2021
Published: 11 June 2021
Citation:
Repp S and Spalek K (2021) The Role
of Alternatives in Language.
Front. Commun. 6:682009.
doi: 10.3389/fcomm.2021.682009
Frontiers in Communication | www.frontiersin.org June 2021 | Volume 6 | Article 6820091
REVIEW
published: 11 June 2021
doi: 10.3389/fcomm.2021.682009
essentially is some and possibly all (i.e. at least some). This is a
well-known scalar implicature: The use of an expression which
has scalar alternatives—some and all are elements on a scale like
{none, some, many, most, all} —, is interpreted as expressing the
exclusion of the alternatives that lead to a stronger meaning1 of
the sentence, that is {many, most, all}. The alternative none is not
directly relevant here because it is incompatible with the truth-
conditional meaning of some. Thus, the sentence Chris ate some of
the biscuits can only be interpreted in the intended way if the
scalar alternatives of some are considered.
Alternatives also play a role in the information structuring of a
clause, most notably for focus and for contrastive topics. Since
Rooth (1985), Rooth (1992), and Krifka (2008) the alternative
semantics view of focus has been very successful in the
explanation of linguistic phenomena as well as in the
description of language processing. According to this view,
focus indicates the presence of alternatives that are relevant
for the interpretation of linguistic expressions (Krifka, 2008:
247). Focus interpretation is anaphoric in that the linguistic
context must provide alternatives, or they must be easy to
accommodate from the situational context. Consider the
sentence CHRIS ate the biscuits, where the small capitals
indicate prosodic prominence of the word Chris, i.e. the
presence of a prominent pitch accent. Since one way of
indicating focus in English is placing prosodic prominence on
a syllable within the focus expression, EChrisF is the focus in this
sentence. As a consequence, our sentence presupposes that
EChrisF is an element in a non-singleton set of alternatives,
where at least one other alternative is provided by the context,
for instance {Chris, Sam}. Usually, our sentence will be taken to
mean that substituting the focus by an alternative results in a false
proposition: It is not true that Sam ate the biscuits. Thus, similarly
to the case of the scalar implicature, the alternatives which are not
the focus themselves are excluded. There are other instances of
focus, where there is no exclusion of alternatives, e.g. when focus
appears in the scope of additive focus-sensitive particles like also
as in Chris also ate CAKEfocus.
It is a natural question to ask at this stage if and how scalar
alternatives and focus alternatives ‘interact’, and what the
consequences are for the resulting meaning. How is focus on a
scalar expression interpreted? Consider (1). In (1a), the accent
takes the default position for sentences with wide focus on the
whole sentence. In (1b), the accent indicates focus on the scalar
expression some in the subject of the clause. So there are two
sources for the relevance of alternatives in the interpretation: the
lexical semantics of some, and the focus.
(1) a. Some of the kids ate CAKE.
b. [SOME]focus of the kids ate cake.
The alternatives that are triggered by these sources arguably
are the same, namely a set of expressions and their denoted
meanings, e.g. {none, some, many, most, all}. Indeed, Fox and
Katzir (2011) argue that focus alternatives and scalar alternatives
are the same. As we discussed above, (1a) means Some but not all
of the kids ate cake because the stronger alternatives are excluded.
We also saw that without an additive focus-sensitive operator,
focus is interpreted as signaling the exclusion of alternatives.
What then is the meaning contribution of focus in (1b)?
To answer this question, it is important to remember that
scalar implicatures do not arise obligatorily. In some contexts,
scalar items receive the semantic at least reading. However, it has
been found that placing an accent on a scalar item, i.e. focusing it,
interacts with the computation of the implicature (e.g. Fretheim,
1992; Chevallier et al., 2008; Schwarz et al., 2008; Franke et al.,
2017). Experimental results indicate that focus leads to a higher
rate of implicature readings. These findings can be explained on
the alternative semantics view that focus presupposes the
existence of alternatives in the context. For (1b) this means
that at least one of the alternatives of some, {none, some,
many, most, all}, must have been mentioned in the discourse
or must be easy to accommodate. Focus then leads to a ‘reliable’
exclusion of the contextual alternative. Note in this connection
that scalarity is not restricted to quantificational elements. Many
properties can be ordered on a scale, for instance {cold, cool,
warm, hot}. Effects of prosody and thus focus on implicature
computation were also suggested for these elements (e.g. Horn,
2006). Conversely, focus can easily evoke alternative sets
involving a scale without an exclusion interpretation: It has
long been noted that in sentences like Chris only won the
[BRONZE]focus medal, the focus-sensitive operator only is not
used to exclude the alternatives (silver and gold): one can only
win one medal in a competition anyway. Rather, the sentence
expresses that bronze was less than what had been expected or
wished for (Jacobs, 1991).
These examples show that alternatives play subtly different
roles in different linguistic domains and that different ‘types’ of
alternatives may interact. The goal of this review article is to
evaluate the concept of alternatives in the linguistic domains
where alternatives have been suggested to play a fundamental role
in the interpretation and structuring of language. These domains
have not been pursued completely independently of each other.
For instance, counterfactuals, scalar implicatures and also focus
often are discussed in relation to negation. However, work that
puts negation into the center of its attention, usually asks and
answers rather different questions than does work on
counterfactuals, implicatures or focus. Our aim is to explore
the various ways in which alternatives play a role for the different
domains and to identify core characteristics of the notion
alternative as well as potential differences between the
domains. As the research on alternatives is carried out in
different areas for each of which there exists a vast research
literature, we cannot give a fully exhaustive review. To
nevertheless achieve our aim, we are a giving a review of a
selection of the existing literature which contextualizes the
original research contributions in the Research Topic The
Role of Alternatives in Language (marked with RT in this
paper), and we will refer the reader to more specific reviews
on individual topics in the respective sections of this paper.
Some linguistic phenomena which might be considered to
involve alternatives are beyond the scope of the current1See Section Negation and Counterfactuals for elaboration on this notion.
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review. These include for instance syntactic ambiguity, because
we focus on alternatives from a semantic-pragmatic point of view,
but also lexical ambiguity, which we do not consider for reasons
of space.
We discuss the concept of alternatives both from the
perspective of linguistic theory and from the perspective of
language processing. Both fields have shown increased interest
in alternatives in the last decades but there is not as much
interchange as one would wish for. In our view, it is crucial to
bring these fields together because the observation that
alternatives are relevant or necessary for interpretation begs
the question how these alternatives become part of the
linguistic representation, which also is a mental representation.
Wemay ask how and when alternatives are activated, and for how
long they remain available—that is, what the temporal
characteristics of alternative activation are, to what extent the
exclusion of alternatives is an active mental process, and whether
it requires mental resources. Issues like these might be relevant
when it comes to grammatical conventionalization or to
interpretation preferences, and the answers might be different
for different types of alternatives.
The paper is structured as follows. In the section Alternatives
in Different Linguistic Domains we discuss the linguistic domains
where alternatives play a role by summarizing the core questions
that have been asked for the respective domain, as well as the
answers that have been proposed both on the basis of theoretical
reasoning and on the basis of experimental evidence gathered
with different methods. The discussion in this section addresses
characteristics of the representation of alternatives in these
domains both from a linguistic (grammatical) point of view
and from a mental model (psychological) point of view. The
section The Activation Process focuses on the issues of processing
listed above, that is on characteristics of the process of
constructing the representation of alternatives, for instance
temporal aspects. In the section Alternatives in the Lab, we
investigate how alternatives as linguistic objects can be related
to possible worlds in experimental settings, that is we discuss the
operationalization of alternatives, which is an important issue for
the experimental investigation of both the grammar and the
processing of phenomena involving alternatives. The section
Alternatives for All? Individual Differences addresses an issue
that has become increasingly relevant in recent years also both
in linguistics and in psycho-/neurolinguistics: the extent and
evaluation of individual differences. These are pervasive in the
realm of alternatives, too, and pose interesting questions for
linguistic and psycholinguistic theories. The section Conclusion
summarizes and concludes.
ALTERNATIVES IN DIFFERENT LINGUISTIC
DOMAINS
Negation and Counterfactuals
As mentioned in the Introduction, for negation the alternative
propositions p and ¬p are relevant: ¬p is what a negative sentence
denotes, p is negated. As simple as it sounds, this state of affairs
has non-trivial consequences for the factors that influence the
grammar and processing of negation. We will focus on two
factors in this section: semantic and world knowledge on the
one hand, and discourse context on the other hand.
Semantic and World Knowledge and Negation
Alternatives
Negative sentences normally are used to express the falsity of a
proposition p whose truth or falsity is at issue. This means that
there must be a chance of p actually being true. A sentence like A
robin is not a tree, although true, is unlikely to be uttered because
the negated proposition p (A robin is a tree) is unlikely to be true
outside very specific contexts. Therefore, sentences negating an
unlikely proposition p are usually pragmatically infelicitous and it
has been shown that they incur increased processing costs and are
harder to recall than pragmatically felicitous negative sentences
(e.g., Wason, 1965; Cornish, 1971; Hörmann, 1971; Johnson-
Laird and Tridgell, 1972; Wason, 1972; Givon, 1978; Watson,
1979; Arroyo, 1982; Glenberg et al., 1999; Nieuwland and
Kuperberg, 2008; Orenes et al., 2016).
The pragmatic (in)felicity of negative sentences is fed by
semantic and world knowledge: We know that robins and
trees are living organisms in different biological
kingdoms—animals and plants—and it is not informative to
say that a particular genus of animal is not a clade in the
plant kingdom. A true positive proposition like A robin is a
bird, in contrast, can be considered informative if the addressee
does not know what particular animal a robin is. There have been
numerous studies investigating the role of pragmatic felicity in
relation to semantic and world knowledge, amongst them two
studies that have appeared in the Research Topic The Role of
Alternatives in Language (2019). Haase et al. (2019)RT
investigated pragmatic plausibility via the co-hyponym relation
such that there is a large semantic feature overlap between
alternatives (unlike for birds and trees), and both alternatives
in principle would be pragmatically plausible in a sentence such
as George Clooney is (not) an actor/singer. Haase et al. employed
the method of event-related brain potentials, which in earlier
research yielded the result that for stimulus sets without
pragmatic control the N400 component on the final word is
larger for false than for true affirmative sentences, whereas for
negative sentences it is the other way round (e.g., Fischler et al.,
1983; Kounios and Holcomb, 1992; Lüedtke et al., 2008;
Nieuwland and Kuperberg, 2008; Wiswede et al., 2013;
Dudschig et al., 2016; for early research using behavioral
methods reporting this truth-polarity interaction, see e.g.,
Wason and Jones, 1963; Gough, 1965; Clark and Chase, 1972;
Carpenter and Just, 1975; for a recent review also on findings not
showing the interaction, see Kaup and Dudschig, 2020). The
truth-polarity interaction has been suggested to result from the
semantic subject-predicate mismatch (e.g., robin—tree) in the
false affirmative and the true negative conditions, and has sparked
discussion about a late integration of the meaning of the negative
marker, to which we turn in the section The Activation Process. As
for the role of pragmatic felicity, Haase et al. replicate the above-
mentioned ERP-findings for the affirmative sentences but for the
negative sentences the (reverse) effect is non-significant. The
authors argue that when the correctly negated predicate is a co-
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hyponym and thus pragmatically felicitous, anticipation of the
negated material is more successful than when there is no co-
hyponymy (they do not take a stance as to whether the N400
reflects expectancy, prediction or integration). Their finding
supports the relevance of pragmatic felicity for the
interpretation of negative sentences, adding to the previous
findings on this issue.
Pragmatics as fed by semantic and world knowledge can also
play a role via conventionalization (Kronmüller and Barr, 2015;
Kronmüller et al., 2017). Kronmüller and Noveck (2019)RT
present evidence from a negative reference task where
participants picked objects with or without conventional
names. A conventional name is for instance vase for a vase.
An object without a conventional name is for instance an
unusually shaped clay form. Participants were instructed not
to pick for instance the sculpture, where the sculpture refers to an
unusual object that in the course of the task had been ad-hoc-
named the sculpture. In addition to “the sculpture,” there were
two alternative objects. When instructed not to pick “the
sculpture,” the choice of object by the participants depended
on whether the other objects both were unusual and on whether
they had a conventional or ad-hoc name (given in the course of
the task) or not. The authors show that linguistic conventions
(names) and contextual linguistic and visual information
influence the inferences listeners make about alternatives
when interpreting negative sentences.
The Discourse Context
A proposition ¬p is true in many different (possible) worlds:
saying what is not the case is not yet saying what is the case.
Therefore, the question arises what representation we form when
we hear a negative sentence. From a grammatical point of view,
we would say that it is a representation containing a negation
operator associated with p, so that two propositions (p and p’¬p)
are elements of the linguistic representation. From a mental
model point of view, the representation might also be one of a
proposition q, which is true in a subset of the ¬p-worlds but tells
us something more about those worlds. For example, when we
hear Chris didn’t eat cake, we might form a mental model
corresponding to Chris ate biscuits, because we know that
biscuits were under consideration in the context (unless we
think that Chris didn’t eat anything at all). Thus, the discourse
context is important for negation because it typically restricts the
number and type of relevant alternatives when interpreting a
negative sentence. This is true especially for the context preceding
the negative sentence, but we will see further below that the
context following a negative sentence also is important: it
influences the anaphoric uptake of the propositional alternatives
p and p’¬p.
One area where the preceding discourse context has been
found to be important is the above-mentioned truth-polarity
interaction, which early on has been suggested to result from a
two-step construction of the representation of negative sentences
(Carpenter and Just, 1975). In recent theorizing, this two-step
construction is formulated as two-step simulation of the mental
model representing the situation described by the negative
sentence (Kaup and Zwaan, 2003; Kaup et al., 2006). The
claim is that first, a situation model is simulated which
corresponds to the (false) positive proposition p—the
affirmative situation—and then a model of the actual, negative
situation is simulated. Two-step simulation has been shown with
different methodologies (e.g., Kaup et al., 2006; Kaup et al., 2007;
Dale and Duran, 2011; Autry and Levine, 2012; Orenes et al.,
2014; Orenes et al., 2016) but there are also proposals that
negation is processed in one step (e.g., Mayo et al., 2004;
Anderson et al., 2010; Papeo et al., 2016). For recent reviews
on these issues, see Tian and Breheny (2019) and Kaup and
Dudschig (2020). Whether or not a simulation happens in two
steps depends (inter alia) on the number and kind of alternatives
that are available in the discourse. In the following, we will discuss
properties of the preceding discourse context that are relevant
with respect to this issue. The actual time course of the activation
of negation alternatives will be discussed in The Activation
Process.
Consider the sentence The window is not open with the
predicate open, which has a contradictory antonym: closed. It
is easy to simulate a situation model of the actual, negative
situation because that model must have a closed window in it.
So there are two alternatives available that may be simulated in
two steps. For predicates with multiple, i.e. contrary antonyms
(e.g., green), it is unclear what the negative situation looks like
because there are many options for the second alternative: blue,
red etc. The linguistic or situational context may restrict the
number of such alternatives and thus provide ‘more suitable’
content for a simulation of the negative situation, and it has been
shown that this has an impact on negation processing (e.g.,
Wason, 1961; Kroll and Corrigan, 1981, also see Mayo et al.,
2004). We are illustrating the relevance of the number of
alternatives here with findings from Orenes et al. (2014), who
conducted a multi-picture visual-world paradigm with four
different colors where a context sentence announced either
two alternative colors (e.g., green, blue), or more than two
alternative colors (e.g., green, blue, yellow, pink) to be present
in the picture. They found that in the two-alternative context,
participants listening to negative sentences like The figure is not
green briefly looked at the green figure and then focused their
attention on the blue figure, i.e. the figure representing the one
contextually plausible negative situation. In the multiple-
alternative context, participants focused on the green figure
only. Thus, when the context restricted the alternatives to two,
two alternatives are activated, otherwise this is not the case.
The preceding context may also influence the availability of
the affirmative situation by providing several ¬q-alternatives
{¬q1, ¬q2, ...}. Assume we wish to ask some students for their
opinions about a city they have never been to. To establish the set
of appropriate addressees, we ask the students:Who hasn’t been to
Bielefeld? This gives us the set of students who have not been to
Bielefeld, and by extension a set of alternative negative
propositions, e.g., {Alex hasn’t been to Bielefeld, Chris hasn’t
been to Bielefeld, Robin hasn’t been to Bielefeld}. This set does
not contain a positive proposition. For negative sentences uttered
in the context of such a question, there does not seem to be two-
step simulation (Tian et al., 2010; Tian and Breheny, 2016). The
context question is the so-called Question under Discussion QuD
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(Roberts, 1996; cf. von Stutterheim, 1997). It introduces and
restricts focus alternatives: The answer to the QuD must contain
an alternative that is an element in the focus alternative set
introduced by the QuD. Thus, similarly to the interaction of focus
alternatives and scalar alternatives (see Introduction), we find that
the mental representation and linguistic relevance of alternatives
from different domains interact. The alternative set relevant for
negation is {p, ¬p}, but with a QuD like the above, the p-
alternative is not relevant/salient, whereas the focus alternatives
prescribed by the QuD are. The interplay of focus and negation has
received considerable interest in the theoretical linguistic literature
(e.g., Jackendoff, 1972; Jacobs, 1991; Partee, 1993; Hajičová, 1996;
Rooth, 1996; Herburger, 2000; Beaver and Clark, 2008; Büring,
2016b). For a recent review, see Fălăuş (2020).
The relevance of the subsequent discourse for negation
alternatives has only recently attracted attention. As already
mentioned, in linguistic theorizing it is typically assumed that a
negative sentence introduces two propositions that are principally
available for anaphoric reference: p and ¬p (e.g., Krifka, 2013;
Meijer, 2016; Meijer and Repp, 2018; Claus et al., 2019). Which
proposition gets picked up by a propositional anaphor depends on
characteristics of the subsequent discourse. Experimental evidence
from acceptability judgment studies suggests that propositional
anaphors like that preferentially are interpreted as taking the
negative proposition ¬p as antecedent (Claus et al., 2019). ¬p is
of course the proposition that is denoted by the negative sentence
(and that is associated with the final situation model). Therefore, a
general preference for ¬p might not be surprising. Importantly,
certain parameters in the sentence containing the anaphor might
change this preference. For instance, modal particles, belief-state
verbs vs. reporting verbs, and counterfactual tenses have all been
suggested to play a role. Claus et al. (2019) show for German that
the presence of the adversative conjunction but vs. the focus
particle auch (‘also/too’) in a dialogue like the following changes
the preference from ¬p to p: A: Tom didn’t steal the bag. B: Jenny
believes that¬p, too./But Jenny believes thatp. Meijer and Repp
(2018), also investigating German, find a shift to
p-interpretations that is triggered by tense and by a modal
particle. Illustrating the former, when someone says Alex wasn’t
here on Monday, a response like That would be weird typically is
interpreted as meaning that Alex’s absence would be weird, i.e. that
refers to ¬p. A response like That would have been weird, in
contrast, is typically interpreted as meaning that Alex’s presence
would have been weird., i.e. that refers to p. The authors argue that
the response in these examples is the consequent of a contextual
counterfactual and means It would have been weird if Alex had
worked on Monday. The interpretive difference between the tenses
results from the specific way tense is interpreted in the consequent
of counterfactuals. The findings from this literature suggest that
negative sentences indeed make available a positive proposition
that principally is available for anaphoric uptake.
Staying briefly with counterfactual sentences, we note that they
are generally interesting for negation alternatives because (typically)
a positive sentence describes a negative situation—and the factual
and a non-factual world are juxtaposed. In indicative conditionals,
the alternatives {p,¬p} also are relevant. Indicatives differ from
counterfactuals in the tense of antecedent and consequent
(counterfactual—past: if there had been... there would have been...;
indicative—present: if there are... there are...). In an indicative, an
antecedent containing the proposition p restricts the truth of the
consequent proposition q to p-worlds and excludes ¬p-worlds. In a
counterfactual, the alternativeness is intuitively more prominent
because the actual world (usually) is assumed to be false and the
non-factual worlds are the worlds ‘of interest.’ In the theoretical
literature, it is usually assumed that for a counterfactual to be
plausible the factual and the non-factual worlds must be very
similar (Goodman, 1955; Stalnaker, 1968; Lewis, 1973). We
cannot address this issue here for reasons of space but we would
like to point out that the similarity approach has recently been
argued to be problematic (Ciardelli et al., 2018). The empirical
argument involves if-clauses with negation, which seem to be judged
differently than would be expected by the similarity approach.
However, Schulz (2019) argues that the negation in the if-clause
introduces alternatives which become relevant for the interpretation,
similarly to alternatives that are introduced by a disjunction in the if-
clause (e.g., Alonso-Ovalle, 2009; Santorio, 2018; Willer, 2018).
Thus, we observe that there are intricate interactions between
different ‘types’ of alternatives in the domain of counterfactual
conditionals, too. For a recent review on counterfactuals, see
Arregui (2020). We return to counterfactual and indicative
conditional sentences in the section The Activation Process, when
we discuss issues of processing.
(Scalar) Implicatures and Exhaustivity
In the Introduction we discussed scalar implicatures involving
scales for quantificational determiners like some, and scales for
predicates like warm. These scales were scalar in an intuitive
sense. A scale like {none, some, many, most, all} is a scale of
quantities, which is something we can measure in the real world
even if the threshold for using a particular element on the scale
rather than its neighbor is not clear in every case. Similarly, scales
like {cold, cool, warm, hot} concern properties in the real world. In
this section, we discuss implicatures that might be considered to
be less intuitively scalar because the relation of strength, which we
appealed to when we talked about the exclusion of scalar
alternatives, seems to concern information states or knowledge
about the world—or indeed, the common ground –, and not
objects or properties in the world.
The Gricean and the Grammatical View of Implicatures
Assume a context where two people are under consideration for
having been invited: Chris and Alex. A dialogue ensues: A: Who
did Toni invite? B: Chris. B’s answer is usually taken to mean that
B invited Chris but not Alex. This is a run-of-the-mill Gricean
implicature (Grice, 1967), where the meaning of B’s answer is a
strengthened meaning. The traditional, Gricean explanation for
why this meaning arises is the following (see e.g., Horn, 1972;
Grice, 1975; Gazdar, 1979; Soames, 1982; Levinson, 2000).
Assuming that B is cooperative, their answer will be relevant
in the context of the question, and it will entail all the information
that is compatible with B’s knowledge. If B knew that Toni invited
Chris and Alex, saying so would have conveyed a stronger
meaning: the proposition Toni invited Chris and Alex is true
in fewer worlds than the proposition Toni invited Chris because
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the latter is also true in worlds where Toni invited Chris but not
Alex. Thus, a stronger meaning is one where we knowmore about
the world we are in. Since B did not choose to express the stronger
meaning, B’s answer implicates that the stronger meaning is not
true—it is excluded—and we arrive at the strengthened meaning
Toni invited Chris but not Alex.
It has long been noted that the original Gricean view faces
problems, which have fueled the development of two different
types of theoretical accounts. One of the most-discussed
phenomena in this regard are embedded implicatures, which
arise in the scope of a higher operator. Returning to our example
from the Introduction, Some of the kids ate cake, recall that the
strengthened meaning is Some but not all of the kids ate cake.
Embedding our example sentence under the verb know yields:
Toni knows that some of the kids ate cake. Intuitively, the sentence
means Toni knows that some of the kids ate cake and Toni knows
that not all of the kids ate cake. It does not mean Toni knows that
some of the kids ate cake and it is not the case that Toni knows that
all of the kids ate cake, which, however, would be expected under a
Gricean account. One type of account assumes that implicatures
of this sort arise due to a silent exhaustification operator, EXH
(alternatively Oalt/Oc)). EXH can be introduced locally, but is (also)
introduced by default at the top node of every matrix sentence.
EXH exhausts the alternatives, i.e. it excludes stronger alternatives,
so that a strengthened meaning arises. This view, which derives
implicatures involving exhaustivity effects compositionally, is the
grammatical view of implicatures and was first proposed by
Chierchia (2004), Chierchia (2006); also see Katzir (2007), Fox
and Katzir (2011), Chierchia et al. (2012), Trinh and Haida
(2015). The other type of account are the (Neo-)Gricean
approaches, including rationalist accounts and relevance-based
accounts, which place pragmatic reasoning at the center of the
explanatory framework (e.g., Sauerland 2004; Van Rooij and
Schulz, 2004; Schulz and Van Rooij, 2006; Benz and Van
Rooij, 2007; Geurts, 2009; Geurts, 2010; Franke, 2011; Russell,
2012; Frank and Goodman, 2012; Frank and Goodman, 2014;
also see Benz and Stevens, 2018). There are also accounts
explicitly combining aspects of both theories (e.g., Potts et al.,
2015). For recent reviews on theories of implicatures, see for
instance Breheny (2019) or Nicolae and Sauerland (2020).
Characteristics of Scalar Alternatives
There are several contributions in the Research Topic The Role of
Alternatives in Language that explore specific characteristics of
scalar alternatives. Trinh (2019)RT investigates the contextual
source of alternatives that are relevant for implicature
computation. Tomioka (2021)RT and Singh (2019)RT explore
implicatures in different subdomains—disjunction,
quantificational determiners, numerals and so-called free-
choice implicatures. Feng and Cho (2019)RT consider so-called
indirect implicatures. In contrast to the direct implicatures we
have investigated so far, indirect implicatures arise when a scalar
term at the endpoint of a scale is negated: Toni did not always go to
the beach last week implicates that it is not the case that Toni
never went to the beach last week, that is sometimes, Toni did go
to the beach. Both Singh (2019)RT and Feng and Cho (2019)RT
investigate the processing cost of these various implicatures. We
will discuss their contributions in the section The Activation
Process, where we will see that the computation of strengthened
meanings can but need not be costly (e.g., Bott and Noveck, 2004;
Breheny et al., 2006; Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Marty et al.,
2013; Chemla and Bott, 2014; Cremers and Chemla, 2014; Benz
and Gotzner, 2020). In this section we concentrate on the role of
the context and discourse factors more generally.
Trinh (2019)RT explores how the set of alternatives that are
relevant in the computation of exhaustivity implicatures can be
restricted in a way that predicts intuitively correct implicatures in
a number of subdomains. For instance, our question-answer
discourse above might have given the impression that the
question provides the relevant alternative set—as it would do
in the case of focus alternatives: {Toni invited Chris, Toni invited
Alex}. However, recall that it is actually the conjunction of these
propositions that is the relevant stronger alternative for the
exhaustivity implicature of the response. So the alternative set
should be {Toni asked Chris, Toni asked Alex, Toni asked Chris
and Toni asked Alex}. But then, why should we not also make
Alex did not ask Chris part of the alternative set? After all, we are
interested in who Toni asked—and thus also in whom they did
not ask. Trinh discusses issues like these within the grammatical
approach of implicatures and explores three notions that may be
used to restrict the alternative set: relevance (closure under
Boolean operations), utterance (what was explicitly uttered in
the linguistic context: “formal alternatives”) and salience (what is
contextually salient). Trinh shows that these notions make
distinct predictions for the computation of implicatures and
argues that salience poses some non-trivial problems.
Tomioka (2021)RT investigates disjunction within the
grammatical approach to implicatures. In the exhaustivity
literature, disjunction has been argued to display some special
characteristics. To illustrate, Hurford’s constraint (Hurford,
1974) says that one disjunct must not entail the other: #Toni
traveled to Cologne or to Germany is infelicitous, because traveling
to Cologne entails traveling to Germany. Interestingly, this
constraint does not apply to disjunctions of scalar alternatives
(Gazdar, 1979): Toni read some or all of the books. This
observation has been explained in the grammatical approach
by assuming that the EXH operator applies to the first disjunct
before the disjunction is interpreted. EXH changes the meaning of
the first disjunct and thus removes the entailment relation: Toni
read some but not all of the books, or all of the books. The order of
the disjuncts is relevant here (Singh, 2008): #Toni read all or some
of the books is infelicitous without a lexical only in the second
disjunct. This observation is explained as a result of incremental
(i.e. left-to-right) computation of the disjuncts, which makes
insertion of EXH into the second disjunct ineffectual, which is
disallowed (Singh, 2008; Fox and Spector, 2018).
Tomioka (2021)RT shows that the empirical observations
about disjunctions carry over to coordinations, subordinations
and even independent sentences that are separated by a turn-take
in conversation. Compare the following contrastive
coordinations: #Toni traveled to Cologne but Alex to Germany;
Toni read some of the books but Alex read all of them; #Toni read
all of the books but Alex read #(only) some of them. Tomioka
argues that the previous accounts cannot explain these facts
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because they rely on disjunction, and proposes that the
alternatives that are at issue here, are focus alternatives: Toni
read [some]focus of the books or Toni read [all]focus of the books. He
proposes the Contrast Antecedent Condition, which requires that
the first of the two sentences provides an antecedent fromwhich a
focus alternative set can be generated that fits the focus in the
second sentence. Furthermore, the focus alternative set must
contain mutually exclusive alternatives comprising the
meaning of both sentences. The asymmetry of Hurford’s
constraint is explained (roughly) as follows: If the meaning of
the first sentence can be strengthened (e.g., some... → some and
not all...) and the meaning of the second sentence (e.g., all...)
provides a mutually exclusive alternative, the result is felicitous. If
the meaning of the first sentence cannot be strengthened (e.g.,
all... →/), the meaning of the second sentence (e.g., some...) does
not provide the required alternative. By appealing to focus rather
than scalar alternatives, Tomioka explains the observed effects in
structures beyond disjunctions.
Focus and Contrastive Topics
In the previous sections, we repeatedly encountered focus
alternatives. We saw that focus interacts with other types of
alternatives (negation, scalars), and that focus alternatives for
some phenomena might offer the better explanation than other
alternatives (scalars). In this section, we consider research where
focus alternatives are the central object of investigation. One
strand of this research is concerned with the prosodic marking of
focus. For instance, for intonation languages it has been shown
that certain accents trigger the activation of alternatives during
comprehension. Often, arguably more prominent accents, like
English L+H* in contrast to H* lead to a more reliable activation
of alternatives (e.g., Dahan et al., 2002; Weber et al., 2006; Ito and
Speer, 2008; Watson et al., 2008; Braun and Tagliapietra, 2010;
Husband and Ferreira, 2016; Braun et al., 2018). Yan and
Calhoun (2019)RT show for a language which marks focus
prosodically not through accenting but through pitch range
extension—Mandarin—that this kind of prosodic prominence
also triggers focus alternatives. Furthermore, the choice of
accentuation pattern in intonation languages has been shown
to influence memory retrieval (e.g., Fraundorf et al., 2010;
Gotzner et al., 2013; Repp and Drenhaus, 2015; Gotzner, 2017;
Tjuka et al., 2020). Finally, the presence of elements that require
focus for semantic reasons, like the focus particle only, influences
the processing and memory of accented words and their
alternatives (Spalek et al., 2014; Gotzner et al., 2016). See
section The Activation Process for more details on processing.
Focus alternatives can be triggered by prosodic means without
discourse context. Since focus is anaphoric, this begs the question
what exactly serves as a suitable focus alternative. Building
on some of the studies mentioned above, Braun and Biezma
(2019)RT, and Yan and Calhoun (2019)RT compared different
types of potential focus alternatives: what they call contrastive
alternatives (words from the same semantic field as the focused
expression, e.g., swimmer—diver), and non-contrastive
alternatives (words which are semantically related via the
event, e.g., swimmer—pool). Braun and Biezma consider the
activation of alternatives by a prenuclear accent that arguably
marks a contrastive topic in German (L*+H). Contrastive topics
have received various analyses, all of which involve information-
structural alternatives: either ‘simple’ focus alternatives, or more
complex alternatives, which may also reflect a specific QuD-
induced discourse (e.g., Büring, 2003; Wagner 2012; Constant,
2014; Büring, 2016a). Braun and Biezma report that prenuclear
L*+H activates alternatives quite similarly as a nuclear focus
accent does, suggesting that a parsimonious analysis of
contrastive topics should assume contrastive topics to be as
similar to focus as possible.
The issue of what a suitable focus alternative is does not only
arise in the absence of context. For the additive particle also, this
issue is notorious. It has been observed that for sentences with
also a relevant alternative must have been uttered in the context
or be entailed by it. Accommodation usually fails, different from
other focus particles: Tim is a sugar addict. He even/#also eats
[candied FLIES]focus. Recall that similarly subtle restrictions on the
contextual availability of alternatives have been discussed for
scalar alternatives by Trinh (2019)RT (section (Scalar) Implicatures
and Exhaustivity). The controversy surrounding also is whether the
context must provide an alternative proposition (e.g., He eats
marshmallows) or whether an alternative to the focused
constituent is sufficient (marshmallows) (Corblin, 1991; Heim,
1992; Asher and Lascarides, 1998; Geurts and van der Sandt,
2004; Roberts, 2010; Tonhauser et al., 2013; Ruys, 2015). Grubic
and Wierzba (2019)RT discuss this issue for the German particle
auch ‘too.’ On the basis of experimental evidence, they argue that
positing the presence of a propositional alternative is too strict but
a sub-propositional alternative neither is sufficient to make the
use of auch felicitous. However, it can be sufficient if merely
accommodating the propositional alternative makes the discourse
more coherent. We will see in the section The Activation Process
that for scalar alternatives, comparable suggestions have been made
(Singh, 2019RT): Creating coherence or/and answering a QuD more
completely are objectives that influence the cost and success of the
computation of the meaning of alternatives.
For some phenomena involving focus alternatives, focus itself
is not enough to create coherence. Cleft sentences are an example.
They are well-known to show exhaustivity effects, for which it is
under debate whether they are a presupposition or an implicature
(e.g., Halvorsen, 1978; Atlas and Levinson, 1981; Horn, 1981;
Percus, 1997; Velleman et al., 2012; Büring and Križ, 2013; De
Veaugh-Geiss et al., 2018; see e.g., Onea 2019 for a recent review).
Furthermore, clefts often are thought to involve contrastive focus,
where the notion of contrast is somewhat unspecified (Repp, 2016
for a discussion of contrast). Destruel et al. (2019)RT argue for
English and French, that the contrast in clefts is a doxastic type of
contrast concerning the interlocutors’ expectations (contrariness
in Zimmermann (2008)): A cleft signals a stark contrast between
what has been said or insinuated by another person and what the
speaker assumes, that is the focus alternatives are restricted by the
discourse context and the contrast concerns properties of the
discourse.
This, or a similar discourse property of clefts might also be
responsible for the observation in Yan and Calhoun (2019)RT that
syntactic focus marking in Mandarin through clefting does not
activate alternatives (whereas prosodic marking does). The
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authors suspect that clefts in Mandarin might require different
context conditions from ‘plain’ focus, which in their experiments
were not given. They also speculate that prosodic prominence and
not focus might trigger alternatives, which would be compatible
with Braun and Biezma’s (2019)RT assumption that contrastive
topics and focus are similar in terms of alternative activation.
However, such a hypothesis leaves open what kind of alternatives
the alternatives are from a semantic point of view: they do seem to
be restricted to contrastive alternatives (swimmer—diver). Note,
incidentally, that these are co-hyponyms, which are also relevant
for negation alternatives (Negation and Counterfactuals).
Generics and Plural Definites
The last domain that we will discuss here are particular nominal
expressions that occur in the subject position of a sentence: bare
plurals as in Beetles fly, and definite plurals as in The beetles are red.
The issue here roughly is to what extent the group of individuals
denoted by these expressions must (not) be homogeneous in
having the property expressed by the predicate of the sentence.
Alternatives come into play in various ways.
The sentence with a bare plural, Beetles fly, is a generic
sentence: It makes a generalization and is true although not all
beetles fly—generalizations allow for exceptions. The term
exception suggests that the predicate in a generic sentence
must apply to the majority of the individuals of interest,
contrary to fact: Birds lay eggs is felicitous although less than
the majority of birds lay eggs—male birds do not. Conversely,
there are generic sentences where the predicate does apply to
the majority of individuals, and nevertheless they are
infelicitous: ?Germans are right-handed (cf. Carlson, 1977).
Thus, an approach to generics which relies on statistical
information like a majority of x and calculates the
probability of having a certain property (Cohen, 1999;
Cohen, 2004) seems problematic. However, the other
prominent approach to generics, which is based on
assumptions about normal individuals or circumstances (e.g.,
Asher and Morreau, 1995) quite clearly also faces problems.
In probabilistic approaches, alternatives have been used to
keep the intuition about the majority rule: the set of individuals
may be restricted by a set of alternatives to the predicate (Cohen,
1999). For instance, for Birds lay eggs, the set of birds intersects
with a set of predicates which only apply to female animals, e.g.,
{lay eggs, give life birth}. Consequently, the relevant set for the
majority rule is female birds. Including predicate alternatives this
way yields the so-called absolute reading of generics sentences
(Cohen, 1999): the sentence asserts something about birds
without comparing birds to other individuals. Generics may
also have a relative reading. For instance, Dutchmen are good
sailors is felicitous because Dutchmen are compared to other
nationalities, and not because the absolute majority of Dutchmen
(even if restricted by a predicate alternative set) are good sailors.
Cohen suggests that on the relative reading, a generic sentence
must have an accent on the subject: to indicate the relevant focus
alternatives. In the absolute reading, the predicate is in focus.
Kochari et al. (2020)RT explore subject and predicate
alternatives and the associated readings in detail for English
and propose that the relative reading is the basic meaning (cp.
Tessler and Goodman, 2019): On the one hand, the relative
reading reduces to the absolute reading if no alternatives for
the subject are available. On the other hand, the relative reading
finds grounding in learning mechanisms, which is critical for
generics because making generalizations requires learning about
the world. Kochari et al. also argue for a third type of alternative:
causal background factors. These factors are additional properties
that are causally relevant for the individuals having the property
at issue in the generic sentence.
For sentences with plural definites, homogeneity becomes
relevant as follows. The beetles are red seems to be truth-
conditionally equivalent to All the beetles are red and express
universal quantification. However, in a situation where some
beetles are red and others are blue—i.e. a “non-homogeneous”
situation –, the sentence with the definite is judged to be neither
true nor false whereas the sentence with the universal quantifier is
simply false. For the negated versions of the two sentences, there
is the same discrepancy. This characteristic of plural definites—to
be neither true nor false if the group of individuals is non-
homogeneous in the property of interest—is known as
homogeneity or gappiness effect, because there seems to be a
truth value gap (Fodor, 1970; Löbner, 1987; Schwarzschild, 1994;
Löbner, 2000; Magri, 2014; Križ, 2015). One explanation for the
effect is that plural definites come with a maximality
presupposition (e.g., Schwarzschild, 1994; Löbner, 2000).
However, this clashes with the observation that in certain
contexts, non-maximal readings are available. For instance,
after a party a sentence like The guests were happy can be true
even if not every single one of the guests was happy (Dowty, 1987;
Malamud, 2012). Another explanation is that plural definites
are semantically underdetermined, and may receive an existential
or a universal reading, depending on the context (downward-
entailing/upward-entailing, Krifka, 1996; /non-monotonic,
Malamud, 2012). The existential and the universal reading are
scalar alternatives, which can be the basis for scalar strengthening
(Krifka, 1996; Magri, 2014; Križ 2015; Bar-Lev, 2018; Križ and
Spector, 2020). In the sections Alternatives in the Lab and
Alternatives for All? Individual Differences we come back to
homogeneity effects of plural definites when we discuss the
contribution by Tieu et al. (2019)RT in relation to the experimental
operationalization of alternatives and individual variation.
This concludes our review of linguistic domains that have been
discussed in relation to alternatives. We see that often it is not
clear yet what kind of alternatives should be assumed to explain a
certain meaning aspect, but also that it is highly plausible that
there are different types of alternatives because they can be
‘combined’—as is the case for focus and scalar alternatives.
We also see that the range of factors determining the selection
of (relevant) alternatives are manifold. Overall, some alternatives
are more context-dependent than others but context and
discourse coherence—maybe unsurprisingly—always play a role.
THE ACTIVATION PROCESS
This section is concerned with the process of activating alternatives.
It addresses two questions: 1) whether the activation of alternatives
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is mandatory for the language processing of the phenomena
discussed above or whether alternatives are activated
strategically by the language users, and 2) what the time course
of this activation process is.
The Nature of the Activation Process
(Mandatory or Strategic)
The question whether the activation of alternatives is mandatory
(automatic) or whether it underlies the strategic control of
language users, has been explored for all the domains where
alternatives are relevant that we discussed in the section
Alternatives in Different Linguistic Domains. Starting with
negation, we already mentioned that two-step theories posit
the mandatory activation/simulation of the affirmative
alternative before the negative alternative. In one-step theories,
in contrast, the negative situation is available immediately.
However, since most one-step theories assume inhibition of
the affirmative situation, both alternatives are activated
simultaneously and hence, again, activation is assumed to be
mandatory. In the Research Topic The Role of Alternatives in
Language, the contribution by Beltrán et al. (2019)RT provides
evidence for the inhibition and thus mandatory activation of the
affirmative alternative. The authors combined the
comprehension of positive or negative action or non-action
sentences with a go/no-go paradigm while measuring event-
related potentials. They observed evidence for inhibition-
related effects for negative sentences. Importantly, these effects
were independent of the action/non-action sentence type,
suggesting that negation triggers inhibition, which indicates
mandatory activation of the positive alternative. However,
evidence has been accumulating that the negative alternative
can be accessed directly and without inhibitory effects if it is
the most plausible one in the context (e.g., Nieuwland and
Kuperberg, 2008; Dale and Duran, 2011; Autry and Levine,
2012). Hence, it has become a fruitful research endeavor to
learn more about the circumstances under which both
alternatives are activated. We discussed some of these
circumstances in the section Negation and Counterfactuals.
Evidence from individual variation (see section Alternatives
for All? Individual Differences) is also informative about the
mandatory vs. strategic nature of the activation process for
negation alternatives: In an eyetracking study on
counterfactuals using pictorial displays reported in Orenes
et al. (2019)RT, participants listened to sentences like If there
had been oranges, there would have been pears, having to infer
that, in fact, there are no oranges and no pears. Initially, that is
within about half a second, a significant group of participants
increased their looks to both the real-world alternative and to the
counterfactual alternative, suggesting parallel activation. Another
group looked only at the real-world alternative. This finding may
be taken to suggest that the activation of the alternative is not
mandatory for the negation alternatives in counterfactuals.
Kulakova and Nieuwland (2016a) review the literature on the
processing of counterfactuals and conclude that while a dual
linguistic representation of both p & q and ¬p & ¬q seems to be
almost part of the definition of counterfactuals, convincing
evidence for the synchronous availability of both representations
is hard to come by. This conclusion indirectly supports
our assumption that the findings by Orenes et al. (2019)RT
speak against a mandatory process. However, as we will see in
the section Alternatives for All? Individual Differences, there is
another explanation available for these observations.
Furthermore, other studies, for example a priming study by
Santamaria et al. (2005), do support the assumption that both
representations (i.e., p& q and ¬p& ¬q) are (generally) available
simultaneously (also see Thompson and Byrne, 2002; Byrne,
2005 for discussion).
Turning to scalar implicatures, recall from the Introduction
that implicatures are not an obligatory part of the ‘final’meaning
of a sentence. Furthermore, we briefly mentioned in the section
(Scalar) Implicatures and Exhaustivity that different types of
scalar implicatures seem to come with different processing
costs. Singh (2019)RT observes that for scales of
quantificational determiners and of logical operators, the
strengthened meaning seems to incur higher processing costs
than the non-strengthened meaning; for scales of numerals and
so-called free-choice implicatures, it is the other way round (e.g.,
Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and Noveck, 2004; Breheny et al.,
2006; Chemla, 2009; Huang and Snedeker, 2009; Marty et al.,
2013; Chemla and Bott, 2014; cp. Chemla and Singh, 2014; Crnič
et al., 2015; Chemla et al., 2016; van Tiel and Schaeken, 2017; for
discussion). These observations might be taken to suggest that for
some implicatures the computation of the strengthened meaning
of a sentence is an additional, non-mandatory process, but for
other implicatures it is not. Singh (2019)RT suggests that rather
than explaining the difference on the basis of the particular
implicature computation, the two resulting meanings should
be compared: 1) in relation to their semantic complexity
(∼presence of EXH), and 2) their usefulness in resolving
uncertainties in a discourse (∼to what extent they answer the
QuD; formulated in terms of entropy; Shannon, 1948; van Rooij,
2004). Singh suggests that semantic complexity may increase cost
for a meaning but if a more complex meaning helps reducing
uncertainty about what the truth is better than a potentially less
complex meaning does, it eventually is less costly. If we thus
assume that alternative scalar meanings are weighed up against
each other, the implicature must be computed in any case, that is
mandatorily. Note by the way that removing uncertainty may be
seen as a discourse factor: answering a question more fully makes
for a successful discourse. Thus, Singh’s proposal supports our
earlier observations about the paramount role of the discourse in
the realm of alternatives.
Apart from discourse, there are several other factors that
might play a role for the (non-)automatic computation of
scalar implicatures, amongst them factors pertaining to the
mental or memory capacities of the language users. For
example, De Neys and Schaeken (2007) show that participants
compute fewer scalar implicatures when they are under a higher
processing load (e.g., Bott and Noveck, 2004; Marty et al., 2013),
which might be a result of the strengthened meaning not actually
being activated. Feng and Cho (2019)RT demonstrate that non-
native speakers in contrast to native speakers do not compute
indirect scalar implicatures (e.g., not always→ sometimes), which
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might be due to working memory limitations or insufficient
linguistic competence in L2. An explanation in terms of
linguistic competence would be compatible with findings for
children, for whom it has been shown that they do not
compute implicatures if they do not know the linguistic
expressions denoting the relevant alternatives, which is often
the case for quantifiers (e.g., Barner et al., 2011; Horowitz et al.,
2018), or if they do not perceive an alternative as relevant
(Skordos and Papafragou, 2016). However, Tieu et al. (2019)RT
observed that neither all children nor all adults compute direct
scalar implicatures, so the competence explanation might not be
sufficient.
Rees and Bott (2018) show that more implicatures are
computed if the alternatives are primed. This is compatible
with the assumption that scalar alternatives are not activated
obligatorily, but if they are activated—i.e. made salient—the
probability of computing an implicature increases. Another
way to increase the salience of alternatives is to use prosodic
prominence. As mentioned in the Introduction, Franke et al.
(2017) and other work show that the rate of scalar implicatures
increases if the scalar term is prominent. Relatedly, Gotzner
(2019) shows that the rate of inference computations
(exhaustivity implicatures and additive presuppositions)
increases in the presence of a contrastive focus accent. She
argues that the accent increases the salience of alternatives and
therefore the likelihood of an inference being derived.
Overall, the evidence suggests that alternative activation might
not be mandatory although the final answer to this question
might depend on the particular type of alternative, i.e. the
linguistic domain or subdomain. Overall, factors like prosodic
prominence indicating focus/salience, or priming, which also is
associated with salience, seem to increase the likelihood that
alternatives are activated. Finally, the cost of alternative activation
is strongly influenced by contextual factors. In the next
subsection, we will focus on those cases where alternatives are
activated and look more closely at the time course of this
activation.
The Time Course of the Activation of
Alternatives During Processing
Assuming that alternatives are activated as part of the language
comprehension process, twomain questions arise: When do these
alternatives become activated and when do they start to influence
the unfolding representation of the utterance? Theories
addressing these questions give rather different answers
depending on the linguistic (sub)domain. For negation and
counterfactuals, some accounts assume that the alternative
reading may be activated (simulated) before the reading
corresponding to the facts. For focus, it is assumed that a
focused expression—which itself becomes part of the discourse
representation immediately—triggers the activation of, and/or
the search for alternatives in the context. Still, findings on the
time course are often contradictory, as we will see below.
Regarding negation alternatives, the time course is a matter
relevant to two-step models. Kaup and Zwaan (2003) and Kaup
et al. (2006), who argued for two-step simulation of the respective
situations, such that the simulation of the affirmative situation (p)
precedes the simulation of the negative situation (¬p), argue on
the basis of their experimental evidence that the tipping point
from representing p to representing ¬p must occur about 750 ms
after having heard or read a negated statement. Hasson and
Glucksberg (2006), who investigated the potential of negated
metaphors to prime a word related to the p vs. ¬p, put the tipping
point at a time between 500 and 1,000 ms, thus supporting Kaup
et al.’s assumptions. Hasson and Glucksberg observed that
initially, recognition of words related to p is facilitated, and
starting from 500 to 1,000 ms, recognition of words related to
¬p is facilitated. Tian et al. (2016), who—recall from the section
Alternatives in Different Linguistic Domains—present data
showing that given an appropriate QuD both representations
are activated in parallel, find that the positive situation is available
for about 900 ms, in accordance with the time estimates given by
Kaup et al. or Hasson and Glucksberg.
The time course of the activation of negation alternatives in
counterfactuals was investigated inter alia by Ferguson et al.
(2008). They presented participants with the negative
antecedent of a counterfactual such as If cats were not
carnivores, followed by a consequent clause consistent with
either the real-world or the counterfactual reality, for instance
families could feed their cat a bowl of carrots . . . Carrots is the
critical word which is consistent with the counterfactual reality
(cats are not carnivores). Evidence from eye movements and
event-related brain potentials, which were recorded while
participants were reading the consequent clause, suggests that
the real-world representation was active at the critical word and
up to two words further downstream the sentence. Only then did
the representation shift. Thus, the counterfactual alternative only
becomes available after the real-world alternative has been
rejected. Similar findings are reported by de Vega and Urrutia
(2012) in a study using event-related brain potentials. These
authors claim that the real-world representation is available for
about 500 ms, but has faded away after 1,500 ms. See Byrne
(2016), Kulakova and Nieuwland (2016a) and Ferguson (2019)
for recent reviews of processing aspects of counterfactuals.
Regarding the activation of scalar alternatives, an important
insight comes from a trio of studies by different authors, but
building on one another: Huang and Snedeker (2009), see also
Huang and Snedeker (2011), carried out an eye-tracking study in
which participants heard sentences like Click on the girl who has
some of the [ITEMS]while looking at a visual world display. In the
display, there were a girl with some but not all items from the
depicted totality next to her, a boy who had the rest of these items,
and a girl who had the totality of a set of different items next to
her. The critical items next to the girls had an overlapping
phonological onset. Thus, eye movements up to and during
the first syllable were informative about whether participants
entertained the strengthened meaning some-but-not-all or the
literal meaning some-and-possibly-all. The results suggest that the
strengthened meaning was available about 800–1,000 ms later
than the literal interpretation. In a similar study, Grodner et al.
(2010) provided more supporting context for the strengthened
meaning, which was then available immediately. Degen and
Tanenhaus (2016) carried out two studies using pictures of a
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gum ball machine (with targets like You have some of the orange
gum balls). In one of their experiments, they followed the
conditions set by Huang and Snedeker (2009) and in the
other, those set by Grodner et al. (2010). They replicated both
patterns but argue that the sum of the evidence supports
immediate availability of the scalar implicature and hence, the
co-activation of both alternatives.
Turning to focus, Gotzner and Spalek (2019) in a recent review
compare the time course of processing for utterances with a
prosodically marked focus vs. utterances where in addition a
focus particle associates with the focus. The authors report
findings supporting the assumption that mere prosodic focus
marking causes an immediate activation of all sorts of related
concepts, not just focus alternatives (contrastive alternatives in
the section Focus and Contrastive Topics). However, there also is
evidence suggesting immediate activation of focus alternatives
only (Braun and Tagliapietra, 2010; Braun and Biezma, 2019RT;
Yan and Calhoun, 2019RT). As time passes, only focus alternatives
remain activated. Evidence comes inter alia from Husband and
Ferreira (2016), who find delays of 750 ms between the
presentation of a constituent prosodically marked for focus
and a potential alternative, and from Gotzner et al. (2013),
who report a similar effect after a delay of 2,000 ms, but only
if the delay has been filled with linguistic material, that is a
sentence continuing the narrative, not for silent delays. After a
matter of minutes and lasting at least up to a day, alternatives of a
prosodically marked focus are recalled better from memory than
alternatives which were not prosodically marked (Fraundorf
et al., 2010; Fraundorf et al., 2013; Tjuka et al., 2020; Koch
and Spalek, 2021).
Utterances containing focus particles do not show early effects,
but the particles counteract the online effects observed for focus
marked by prosody only, like the facilitated visual recognition of
words denoting these alternatives. Gotzner et al. (2016) presented
words denoting an alternative about 2 s after a focused element
and participants had to decide whether this word had occurred in
the sentence (the correct answer was no). This decision was made
more slowly in sentences with a focus particle than in sentences
without a particle. Gotzner and Spalek (2019) assume that the
presence of a focus particle triggers an active search for relevant
alternatives and that this search causes activated elements to
compete, which leads to interference during processing.
Eventually though, as in the case for prosodic prominence,
focus particles improve memory for alternatives (Spalek et al.,
2014).
Summarizing the discussion in the section The Activation
Process, we found that for some phenomena involving
alternatives, the alternatives seem to be available very early,
even immediately, whereas for other phenomena, the
activation of alternatives is delayed, and there are even
findings (for negation and counterfactuals) suggesting that the
expressed meaning is available later than the alternative, which
needs to be suppressed in processing. Our short review has shown
that there is no clear divide by linguistic domain (negation,
scalars, focus, etc.). The most striking observation is that for
all investigated phenomena, there is at least one study suggesting
the immediate availability of an alternative or, in the case of
negation and counterfactuals, the immediate availability of the
negative situation/the counterfactual world. As Degen and
Tanenhaus (2016) demonstrate, the exact experimental details
play an important role. Even more important seems to be the role
of context. In psycholinguistic experiments, stimuli are often
presented shorn of any context to allow for better comparisons
between conditions. However, this may render the stimuli highly
unnatural. As we saw time and again in the section Alternatives in
Different Linguistic Domains, context is crucial in the
interpretation and relevance of alternatives. If our aim is to
understand real-time processing of alternatives, we will have to
resort to studies embedding stimuli in naturalistic contexts to
closely mimic the way these alternatives are encountered in
everyday language use.
Alternatives in the Lab
For experimental studies, it is always challenging to
operationalize the main concepts. Oftentimes, a researcher has
to make choices that are justified more by experimental design
and considerations of doability than by the theory. In this section,
we discuss how alternatives can be, and have been operationalized
in experiments and what influence this may have on experimental
results, focusing on the contributions to this Research Topic.
A first operationalization choice concerns whether alternatives
are contextually given or not, and if they are given, whether this is
through the linguistic or the situational context, for example by
visual co-presence. Doyle et al. (2019)RT established alternative
sets by placing pairs of (toy) objects on a table and naming them.
In a subsequent shopping task involving negative and positive
instructions, one object was the target and the other its
alternative. Thus, the alternatives were operationalized by co-
presence in the situation context. To illustrate, the objects on the
table could be an orange and a coconut, and the instruction could
be: The next item is not the orange, which creates the
propositional alternative set {The next item is not the orange;
The next item is the orange}. Given the context, an inferential step
is necessary from not-the orange to the-coconut.
Both the visual and the linguistic context were manipulated by
Kronmüller and Noveck (2019)RT in their study of alternatives in
relation to conventionalization (section Negation and
Counterfactuals). The alternatives were determined through
co-presence in the current pictorial display and through
displays presented previously.
Discourse context as a provider of alternatives is central in
Grubic andWierzba (2019)RT, who explored the requirements for
alternatives for the interpretation of the German focus particle
auch (‘too’). The authors found that alternatives are most likely
propositions but that these propositions need not necessarily be
salient in the discourse context since comprehenders go to great
lengths to identify—and accommodate—relevant propositions.
Destruel et al. (2019)RT in their study on clefts also provide
alternatives in the linguistic context. Overall, this
operationalization choice is closest to Rooth’s (1992)
assumption that focus interpretation introduces an anaphoric
variable, which requires an antecedent in the preceding discourse.
Often, visual displays are not used for actually introducing
alternatives but for testing what the mental representation of a
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listener might look like, for instance in Orenes et al. (2019)RT
and Braun and Biezma (2019)RT. The authors presented what
they thought the participants’ mental representation of
alternatives might be in pictorial form or as words on the
screen. For the counterfactuals tested by Orenes et al. (If
there had been oranges, there would have been pears), the
actual world is one without oranges and without pears
(¬p&¬q). This is the representation the participants were
expected to form. In the corresponding target picture,
oranges and pears were crossed out. The target alternative
picture corresponding to the counterfactual world was one
with oranges and pears (p&q). As the authors highlight, a
distractor picture, which contained apples and strawberries,
would also have been consistent with ¬p&¬q, i.e. no oranges,
no pears. However, their data suggest that participants preferred
an explicit cancellation, as depicted in crossed out oranges and
pears. Thus, the mental representation of the alternative set is
essentially one of negation alternatives.
In Braun and Biezma’s study on contrastively marked topics,
the display consisted of different words, one of which was an
alternative to the sentence subject. This alternative had been
determined empirically in a not X, but Y task where participants
continued sentence fragments like Not the gymnast had gotten
blisters but the . . .. Thus, the authors tried to predict a likely
relevant alternative and presented this in the visual environment.
If participants look at the alternative more often than at controls,
the authors conclude that the alternative has been activated. One
caveat in these types of design is that one cannot know whether
participants would have activated the particular alternative had it
not been presented in the context: the activation could have been
triggered retro-actively by the visual presentation. A similar
problem arises with lexical decision tasks that are employed to
gauge alternative activation through a contrastive accent (here:
Yan and Calhoun, 2019RT). A useful way to think about focus
alternative activation is to assume that focus creates a placeholder
for alternatives.2 This placeholder can be filled either
anaphorically from elements in the preceding context, or it
can be linked with a likely candidate that is presented after
the fact.
Visual presentation of alternatives as a means to find out about
participants’ mental representation is also employed by Kochari
et al. (2020)RT, who investigated the processing of generic
sentences with bare plural subjects. As mentioned in the
section Generics and Plural Definites, they argue that for the
interpretation of generics, three different types of alternatives are
important, two of which they test in their experiments:
alternatives relevant for the absolute reading of generics
(predicate alternatives), and alternatives relevant for the
relative reading (subject alternatives). In the experiments, two
pictures were presented: one for the target sentence (Beetle type A
mostly with dots), and one depicting an alternative subject
without the property at issue (Beetle type B without dots). The
authors found that the alternative picture indeed was taken into
account to judge the truth of the generic, albeit by only part of the
participants.
Sometimes, alternative sets are not provided in the
experimental setup but are assumed to be created through
inferential processes on the basis of characteristics of the
expressions for which alternatives are relevant. For instance,
if a scalar term like some is presented, participants are supposed
to infer the strengthened meaning on the basis of a linguistically
determined scale. Hence, the alternative set and its members
need not be experimentally manipulated. Instead, what is
usually manipulated are the combinations of utterances and
pictures that are used to assess whether participants have
interpreted an implicature or not. An interesting facet (e.g.,
Feng and Cho, 2019RT) are negated scalar expressions due to the
combination of scalar and negation alternatives. The alternative
set in this case seems to consist of the non-negated (affirmative)
semantic meaning, as well as the negative semantic meaning and
its strengthened meaning, in line with two-step theories of
negation processing.
Experimental displays without ‘explicit’ alternatives have
also been used for the investigation of homogeneity. Tieu
et al. (2019)RT presented pictures of a set of the same objects
(e.g., hearts) either in a single color or in different colors.
Participants judged the felicity of sentences with plural
definites like The hearts are yellow for a picture of red and
yellow hearts. The experiment was carried out in French with
French-speaking children. Crucially, the authors employed a set
of critical comparisons to determine how the plural definites are
interpreted. These included sentences with the scalar
expressions none, some, and all. Thus, scalar alternatives do
not become relevant through direct, explicit juxtaposition. Still,
they are obviously contextually present in this setup. Similarly,
Beltrán et al. (2019)RT and Haase et al. (2019)RT in their
investigations of neural processing mechanisms during
negation processing do not use explicit alternatives. However,
Haase et al. used stimuli which had alternatives across
experimental trials as they contained co-hyponyms to the
hyperonym professions. So this study, too, involved a
discourse context providing alternatives.
The studies by Haase et al. (2019)RT and Yan and Calhoun
(2019)RT illustrate another design choice. As we saw, researchers
often provide possible co-hyponyms in order to probe whether
alternatives are active. There is nothing in the definition of
alternatives that requires this relationship and, in fact, for
focus alternatives, a number of studies have tested explicitly
whether alternatives have to be co-hyponyms (Gotzner, 2015;
Kim et al., 2015; Jördens et al., 2020): The answer is no. Still, it is
interesting to ask why co-hyponymy is often used as a convenient
shortcut in the operationalization of alternatives. First, Rooth’s
focus semantic value is often ‘translated’ for empirical purposes as
the set of propositions obtained by replacing the focused element
with an alternative of the same semantic type such that the
proposition is still sensible. Co-hyponyms are well suited for
this: If I can carry out an action (cut, squeeze, bake) with an
individual, I can usually carry out that action with individuals
which are denoted by co-hyponyms. Co-hyponyms are used
particularly often for testing contrastive focus. Repp (2010)2This idea goes back to Steven Crain.
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discusses the notion of contrast and cites Kiss’s (1998)
requirement that contrastive focus needs a complementary
alternative set with clearly identifiable elements. This means
that the alternative set has to be closed and that alternatives
need to be mentioned in the context. Co-hyponymy might
contribute to identifiability: If a given hyperonym has only
very few hyponyms, the alternative set is easily identifiable.
The closed-set argument might apply to all co-hyponym
relationships, but it may be easier for some than for others.
Alternatives for All? Individual Differences
An important aim in any field of research is to formulate
generalizable conclusions that hold for a well-defined
population. However, it has become clear that “all language
users” or even “all adult native language users” defines the
population too broadly. While it is relatively uncontroversial
that native language speakers differ from language learners
and children differ from adults, the insight has gradually
emerged that even within the group of native, adult language
users, subgroups can be found who process a given linguistic
phenomenon differently (Kidd et al., 2018). Thus, the challenge
becomes to describe and understand the dimensions along which
the population is grouped. For instance, in the field of scalar
implicatures, so-called logical comprehenders and pragmatic
responders emerge. While logical responders do not draw the
implicature, interpreting, for example, an utterance containing
the scalar term some as some-and-possibly-all, pragmatic
responders do, interpreting the term as meaning some-and-
not-all (Noveck and Posada, 2003; Bott and Noveck, 2004
(Exp. 3); Bott et al., 2012; Tomlinson and Bott, 2013;
Spychalska et al., 2016). In this final section, we investigate if
groups can be identified also for the processing of other
alternative-related phenomena.
Five of the contributions in this Research Topic address
individual differences, either in passing or as a research
question in its own right. They fall into two categories with
regard to how they look at individual difference. Either groups
were defined beforehand (children vs. adults: Doyle et al.; L1 vs.
L2 speakers: Feng and Cho) or emerging groups were described
(Orenes et al., Kochari et al.). Tieu et al. are a special case in that
they hypothesized the existence of three groups, but did not know
how exactly these might be represented in the population they
tested.
Starting with the first category, recall that Doyle et al. (2019)RT
investigated negation processing with a shopping task. Adults and
children selected one item from a set of two and put it in a
shopping cart. Both their response latencies and their eye
movements were measured. The authors observed that both
adults and children looked more often at the non-target when
hearing a negative than a positive sentence (e.g., for The next item
is not an apple they looked more often at the apple than they
looked at the non-apple for The next item is an apple.). However,
children were slower in their responses. The authors conclude
that children’s processing of negation is not yet as effective as
that of adults (cf. Nordmeyer and Frank, 2014). Feng and Cho
(2019)RT compared direct and indirect scalar implicatures
(sometimes → not always; not always → sometimes) for native
speakers of English and L2 English learners with a covered box
paradigm. Participants were presented with a visible picture and
an invisible one (the covered box) and chose either, depending on
the meaning they assign to a sentence they hear. The groups
behaved remarkably similar. The only significant difference was
obtained when a no-inference picture was chosen for the indirect
scalar implicature. In this case, non-native speakers were more
likely to select the visible picture (i.e., to suspend the inference)
than native speakers. Both these acquisition studies support the
assumption that there exists a developmental path to a certain
manner of processing. Children and L2 learners differed from
adults/native speakers in the most effortful condition only,
suggesting that they had not yet reached mastery with the
computation of these meanings.
As mentioned, Tieu et al. (2019)RT predefine three groups in
their study on plural definites but what they find is on the one
hand different groups, and on the other hand unexpected
individual differences. Recall that adults display a truth-value
gap for the use of plural definites in non-homogeneous situations
(The beetles are red is neither true nor false if only some beetles
are red; section Generics and Plural Definites; Križ and Chemla,
2015). Tieu et al. reason that young children might fall into the
following groups: The “homogeneity group,” whose performance
equals that of adults, the “existential group,” who accepts the
affirmative description but rejects the negative one (→ there are
some beetles that are red), and the “universal group,” who accepts
the negative description but rejects the affirmative one (→ it is not
the case that all the beetles are red). Tieu et al. observe that adults
are not as uniform a group as was previously assumed: a small
number of adults interpreted the utterances universally. Children
fell either into the “homogeneity” or the “existential group.”With
even more fine-grained group assignments, the authors identified
three groups of children: those who interpreted the plural
existentially and did not compute scalar implicatures, those
who made the homogeneity assumption and computed scalar
implicatures ( adult-like), and those who have adult-like
homogeneity readings while not computing scalar
implicatures. An interesting question is whether these groups
in the child population will all develop into the adult
“homogeneity group” or whether a certain group is more
likely to end up interpreting these utterances universally, just
as a small subgroup of adults did.
In the study by Orenes et al. (2019)RT on counterfactuals, the
focus on individual differences also was post-hoc and it was driven
by the observation that confidence intervals by participants were
much larger than those by items. As mentioned in the section The
Time Course of the Activation of Alternatives During Processing,
participants’ looks to the picture representing the factual world
(¬p&¬q) and to the picture representing the counterfactual world
(p&q) started to rise quickly upon presentation of a
counterfactual. After indicative conditionals, in contrast, only
looks to the p&q picture were observed. A post-hoc analysis
revealed that one group of participants showed exactly the same
looking behavior for indicative conditionals and counterfactuals:
they looked more at the p&q picture. The other group looked at
both pictures (or only at ¬p&¬q). Orenes et al. argue that the
participants who only looked at the p&q picture for both types of
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conditionals did not retrieve the correct meaning for the
counterfactual target sentence. Kulakova and Nieuwland (2016b)
have traced some of the individual differences in processing
counterfactuals back to differences in the participants’ abilities to
understand the communicative intentions of others.
Finally, Kochari et al. (2020)RT observed considerable
variation between individual participants in their study on
generics. As briefly mentioned above, they found that the
alternative picture required for the relative meaning of the
generic ( subject alternatives) was only considered by one
group of participants. The other group interpreted the generic
with an absolute meaning, independently of the presence of a
picture which would license the relative reading.
In sum, there are several independent challenges when
investigating individual variation. First, individuals who do not
understand a target structure as intended need to be eliminated
from the sample and, ideally, an explanation needs to be found for
why they do not process the structure as intended. Second,
researchers need to determine whether the remaining
individuals all reach their interpretation in the same way or
whether there are different pathways to (correct) understanding.
And there are many more potential challenges surrounding
individual differences in language processing, whose scope we
are only beginning to understand.
CONCLUSION
This review has discussed the notion of alternatives in meaning
interpretation in several linguistic domains. We have argued that
there is good reason to believe that there are indeed different
“types” of alternatives, which are subject to different conditions,
and which may interact. Although discourse context is crucial for
all types of alternatives, it is probably only semantically required
for focus alternatives, as focus alternatives are licensed via
anaphoric context conditions. However, we saw that the
accommodation of focus alternatives is possible and that in
the absence of context, lexical-semantic relations like co-
hyponymy are exploited. Furthermore, the desire to create
coherent discourses also guides the search and selection of
alternatives. We have also argued that the precise mechanisms
of the on-line activation of alternatives is highly controversial and
that the evidence often is inconclusive. Factors influencing this
state of affairs are on the one hand the operationalization of the
notion of alternatives in experimental settings, and on the other
hand individual variation, which poses challenges both for
descriptive generalizations and for theoretical modeling. We
hope to have made a contribution to the field of alternatives
research that inspires future work which intersects aspects of
grammar and processing to an even greater extent than the last
decade has already seen.
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